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THE LEGAL STATUS OF PARASTATALS: 
ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCE
T. J. N yapadi*
INTRODUCTION
State participation in the economic sector, for example, in areas of produc­
tion, trading and the provision of public utility services1 is rapidly growing in this 
country as the Government wrestles with a large number of economic problems. 
These economic problems largely emanate from under development and uneven 
distribution of the country ’ s econom ic activities resul ting from the pol icies of the 
previous regimes. These regimes created an undesirable dichotomy in the 
structure of the country’s economic activities so that on the one hand there exists 
a sophisticated commercial and industrial sector, mainly in the major cities and 
towns, while on the other hand, the communal areas where the majority of the 
country’s population lives, remain largely underdeveloped.2 There is therefore 
an obvious need to provide an even and widespread basic infrastructure for the 
economy in this country in order to accelerate the development of productive 
forces even in areas which the colonial governments neglected perhaps through 
lack of funds or narrowly defined objectives designed to concentrate on those 
areas of the economy which could produce maximum profits with relevant case.3
State participation in the economy takes at least two forms. The first is where 
the Slate does hot itself take over any sector of the economy, but rather seeks, 
through a variety, of regulatory and other mechanisms (c.g. tax incentives, 
subsidies, laws requiring import and export licences, etc.), to influence the 
conduct of certain economic factors. The second is where the State actually 
enters into, for example, production or marketing and moves from indirect 
control of, to actual participation in the economy.4
Generally, both forms of intervention in the economy have been applied by 
all governments in this country in the past, except that in the last seven years there 
has been a steady increase in direct participation.5 This increased direct partici-
* Lecturer, Department of Procedural Law, Faculty of Law, U.Z.
' Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation Act No. 31 of 1982; Mineral Marketing 
Corporation Act No. 2 o fl 982; and Zimbabwe Railways Act (Chap. 261) respectively arc 
a few examples of this.
2 See the Second Reading Speech of the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce on the 
Small Enterprise Development Corporation Bill in 1983, Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Assembly, Vol. 7 Col. 152.
3 See Nkala, J. and Nyapadi, TJ. 1987 unpublished manuscript entitled “Parastalals in 
Zimbabwe.’!
4 See Ghai, Y. Law in the Political Economy of Enterprise Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies (Uppsala), 1977, p.18.
5 Sec also Transitional National Development Plan (T.N.D.P.) 1982/3-1984/5, Vol. 1 p.l. 
Note that the words parastalals, public corporations and statutory' corporations are used 
interchangeably throughout this article.
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pation has been achieved through the creation of more parastatals such as Slate- 
owned enterprises, public corporations or statutory corporations and this in turn 
has raised questions of the place of these parastatals within the constitutional 
framework of this country.
The problem has largely centred on the. question of Ministerial control of 
Slate-owned enterprises and the determination of the degree and nature of the 
control which Ministers have over them. It will be appreciated that determination 
of these issues will raise various problems. For example, it will be seen that too 
much Ministerial control reduces parastatals to the status of Government 
departments, with a consequent loss of managerial freedom within the parastatal 
itself, and on the other hand, too little Government control usually exercised 
through the appropriate Minister will place the State-owned corporations (par- 
aslatals) outside the democratic regime.6 Thus Wade has observed:
“The problems of these corporations lie largely in filling them , 
into the established constitutional framework and in finding the,
. right balance of power between them, the Government and 
Parliament. These are questions of constitutional rather than 
administrative law. Nevertheless there are certain legal issues; 
and public corporations arc so important an administrative 
mechanism that some remarks about them may be useful,”7
The objective of this article, therefore, is to examine the administrative 
mechanism of parastatals in Zimbabwe with particular reference to Ministerial 
control of them first before national independence and, secondly, in the period 
after independence. In doing this, I shall look at the degree and character, of 
Ministerial control of parastatals through thc.usc of directives. Firstly however,
I shall review the main and general objectives for the creation of parastatals in 
order to put the question of Ministerial control of them in proper perspective.
OBJECTIVES OF PARASTATAL ORGANISATIONS
Parastatals may be created in two ways; firstly by the acquisition of equity 
share capital in an existing company, in which case the objectives of such a 
parastatal will be clearly slated in the memorandum of association8 of the 
company; secondly by statute (these arc in the majority at the moment), in which 
ease the objectives of a particular parastatal will be staled in the establishing Act. 
In this paper the concern is not with those objectives which arc usually narrowly 
defined to suit each parastatal, but rather the objectives of parastatal organiza­
tions in their wider sense which Robson,9 has stated and which I summarize as 
follows.
See also Robson, W'.A. Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership, (2nd ed.), Allen & 
Lnwin, London, 1962, p, 138 and also Socialist Union: Twentieth Century Socialism 
(1956) p.65.
7 Wade II.W.R. Administrative Law, 4th Ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, p.142.
. An example of this is the Zimbabwe Tron and Steel Company (ZISCO).
9 Robson, W.A. op cit, Chapter II, pp.29^15.
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First, the policy of public ownership springs in the main from a conviction 
that socialism requires the public ownership and operation in the interest of the 
whole community of the basic industries, such as fuel, power and transport 
industries.
Secondly, there it is argued that certain industries which are.by their nature 
monopolistic; for example, fuel and power industries like the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority must be Slate owned, because it is too dangerous 
-to leave them to be exploited by private enterprise for profit. For example, in the 
case,of the National Railways of Zimbabwe (which makes a loss every' year) 
farcs would be increased in order to make profit with the result that the public, 
with no choiceor alternative forms of transport, would be forced to pay the higher 
fares.
Thirdly, some industries decline during periods of economic depression 
causing serious social problems of unemployment hence the need to bring such 
industries under public ownership. Furthermore, where a Government spends 
huge sums of money annually subsidizing a privately owned enterprise, for 
example, in order to keep prices down because it provides an essential service 
to the community, the Government might as well own that enterprise.
Fourthly, there is a belief that competition in some industries would lead to 
a waste of resources. For example, direct internal competition in the same areas 
over the provision of say railways or the supply of electricity will rarely be 
economically beneficial. Thus participation of the State in such industries and 
others, like an airline, avoids duplication in at least the basic industries which 
require very huge capital expenditure.
Another factor to consider here is that of national security. It will not be in 
the national interest in as far as the security of the Stale is concerned if, for 
example, our national airline was privately owned, particularly where it shares 
technical expertise and aerial secrets with the national Air Force. Similarly, it 
would not be in the national interest to allow the broadcasting services as 
provided by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation to be in the hands of 
private entrepreneurs who may be hostile to the Stale and thereby allow the 
broadcasting services to propagate misleading information, which is likely to 
cause alarm, uncertainty, civil commotion and insecurity to the whole nation.
It thus can be observed that there is no one reason for public ownership of 
industries or direct State participation in the economy. Everything depends on 
the social, economic and political climate prevailing at any given lime. Hadden10 
has written that:
“The fact that the supply of electricity and the railways and 
airlines are nationalized in most countries, for instance, is better 
attributed to the nature of the industries than to the politics of the 
ruling parties.”
This perhaps explains why a few industries such as Air transport, the
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Broadcasting Services, the Railways, the Posts and Telecommunication Serv­
ices, and the Supply of Electricity) were nationalized during the colonial period 
in a capitalist-based economy. However; it is common to find that in socialist 
countries there are more statutory corporations than there arc in capitalist 
countries. This is perhaps because most socialist countries believe that the State 
should control the means of production and distribution in order to eliminate the 
imbalances created by the capitalist system and permit a more equitable and 
beneficial distribution of resources throughout the community.
Assuming that the Government of Zimbabwe has well defined general 
objectives the question would become how it should pursue them effectively 
within the context of the country’s capitalist economy. The answer to this lies in 
the way the Government seeks to control parastatal organizations.
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF PARASTATAL ORGANISATIONS
Parliament creates parastatals and so it is right that parastatals should 
ultimately be controlled by Parliament. But Parliament cannot itself take direct 
control of a parastatal and hence it appoints a Minister, generally known as an 
“appropriate Minister”, as its representative with the duty to supervise the 
parastatal in abroad sense. This means that the appropriate Minister, as a member 
of Parliament, represents the parastatal in Parliament and at the same time 
represents Parliament to the parastatal concerned. There is, therefore, a constant 
interaction between the two bodies, although this docs not mean that the Minister 
participates in the day-to-day management of the parastatal. Such management 
is usually left to the Board of each parastatal. On this, the former Minister of 
Transport, Dr. H. Ushcwokunzc, in his speech in Parliament had this to say:
“In a developing country like Zimbabwe where the supremacy of 
the Legislature is very much alive it is desirable and proper that 
public enterprises continue to be structured in this manner if  they 
arc to play their full role as instruments of social transformation.
Only in this manner can they be expected to achieve the objec­
tives of the Government in their respective operating sectors.”10 1
In India, for instance, parastatals operate as joint stock companies whose 
control is through the Companies Act. They arc, thus operated, regulated and 
controlled in the same manner as private enterprises registered under the same 
Companies Act. This, of course, isin contrast to the situation in Zimbabwe where 
most parastatals are set up through a special enactment and thus fall under a 
particular Ministry.
10 Madden, T., Company Law and Capitalism Wcidcnfeld and Nicholson London, 2nd ed. 
pp.501-502.
11 Parliamentary Debates (House Assembly) Vol. 14, No. 38, 10th November 1987, Col. 
2279:
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MINISTERIAL CONTROL OF PARASTATALS BEFORE 
INDEPENDENCE
The most important difference between the earlier generation of statutory 
corporations and those established after Independence lies in the much greater 
degree of ministerial control over the latter. In the first generation of statutory 
corporation, that is, those created before independence, political control was 
comparatively less articulated. The appropriate Minister possessed certain 
powers over statutory bodies and these powers were limited to specific matters. 
For example, section 19 of the Air Zimbabwe Act (Chap. 253) provides that:
“(1) If in the opinion of the Minister, it is expedient in the public 
interest that the Corporation should supply any air transport 
service or carry out any aerial work or other operations 
which, in his opinion, arc incidental, ancillary or conducive 
to or capable of being carried out in conjunction with the 
provision of the air transport service, he may direct, in 
writing, the Corporation to supply such air transport service 
or carry out such aerial work or other operations, as the case 
may be.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Corporation with all due expedi­
tion to comply with the provisions of a direction issued in 
terms of subsection (1).” *
Clearly it will be noticed that there arc no general powers of control given to 
the Minister of Transport by this Act. Such powers, in fact, were and still are, 
vested in the Board in terms of section 4 of the said Act which provides that the 
“operation of the Corporation shall, subject to the provisions of this Act-be 
controlled by a Board to be known as Air Zimbabwe Board.”
Other enactments of this time, for example, the National Railways Act 
(Chap. 261), were less precise on the powers given to the Minister. Section 23 
of the National Railways Act provides that:
“23. ■ (1) The Minister may, after consultation with the Board 
give to the Railways such directions of a general or 
specific character in the exercise by it of its functions, 
duties or powers as appear to the Minister to be 
requisite in the national interest.
(2) If it appears to the Minister that there is a defect in the 
general plan or arrangements of the Railways for 
performing any of its functions or exercising any of its 
powers, he may, after consultation with the Board, 
give to the Railways directions of a general character 
for remedying the defect.
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(3) The Railways shall, with all due expedition, comply 
with any direction given to it in terms of subsection (1) 
and (2).”
Thus, it is clear that Ministerial powers over statutory Corporations were 
formulated in general rather than in specific terms. The only exception was the 
powers of control given to the Minister over the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation (Z.B.C.). Here the powers of Ministerial control were much greater 
than those given to Ministers over other statutory corporations. In terms of 
section 29 of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Act (Chap. 248) the Minister has 
powers to require the corporation or any operator of a diffusion service to 
broadcast or diffuse, as the case may be, an announcement or statement of public 
importance which the Minister may supply in writing. In short, the Minister 
could require particular matters to be broadcast. Similarly the Government has 
power to prohibit the broadcasting of any matter or in time of emergency, such 
as in a war situation, to take over the transmitting stations and assume complete 
control of the undertaking. However, the fact that the Government possessed 
enormous contingent powers over thc Z.B.C., docs not mean it is possessed of 
powers to control the day-to-day management of the Corporation.
The picture that emerges is that the Government, through the appropriate 
Minister, has power to control the operations of paraslalals. Each establishing 
statute expressly declares that the Minister has power to give direction about any 
matter relating to the corporation. Accordingly, it becomes pertinent to discuss 
the manner and extent of the exercise of these powers during both the pre- and 
post-independence periods.
Firstly, it is important to note lhaL the Minister can only exercise these powers 
in his/her official capacity as a Government representative and not in his/her 
individual capacity. Furthermore, it should be noted that a paraslatal is a juristic 
body and is a separate entity distinct from those who control it, but it cannot act 
in its own person, for it is not a natural person, hence it must act through the 
agency of other persons, and those persons are the members of the Board of each 
parastatal.12 The functions of a paraslaLal arc vested in members of the Board 
who, in the opinion of the Committee of Inquiry into Paraslatals,13 must provide 
leadership, identify the objectives of the parastatals they represent and indicate 
to the management how those objectives can be attained, and ensure that the 
relevant paraslatal carries out its. functions which are set out in the relevant 
establishing statute. AUhough the members of Boards arc appointed by the 
Paraslalals Commission with the approval of the Minister, they arc intended to 
enjoy managerial liberty subject, of course, to Ministerial control should the 
policies of the paraslatal conflict with the national interest. This clearly suggests, 
as Wade14 rightly points out, that:
12 In some paraslalals the word “Authority" is used as in the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority, rather than the word Board.
13 Air Zimbabwe Corporation Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Parastatals, 
chaired by Mr. Justice Smith -  November 1986, pp.14-15.
M Wade, H.W.R., Administrative Law, (op cit) p.144.
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“There was to be a distinction between broad policy and day-to- 
day administration, the former being the sphere in which the 
Government might interfere, and the latter being the sphere of 
independent self-management.”
The same author goes on to say that words, such as “such directions of general 
or specific character,” vague as they may appear to be, are intended to express 
the distinction between control over general policy in the national interest, for 
which the Minister is responsible to Parliament, and the ordinary business 
management of the industry, in which the parastatal is expected to be free from 
Ministerial interference.15 Further support of these basic premises upon which 
parastatals are created can be gathered from some pronouncements cited by 
Ghai. In respect of public corporations in Kenya he quotes the following excepts:
“We are seeking, in its day-to-day operations, whole detachment 
or partial detachment from one department or another of a public 
corporation free from political interference, because we did not 
wish to upset the commercial success of the undertaking . . .  we 
were giving this greater degree of managerial autonomy in order 
that we could get a higher degree of business efficiency and less 
red tape and bureaucracy.. .  [its a] corporation clothed with 
powers of Government, but possessed of the flexibility and 
initiative of a private enterprise. . .
The public corporation is based on the theory that a full measure 
of accountability can be imposed on a public authority without 
requiring it to be subject to ministerial control in respect of 
managerial decisions and multitudinous routine activities, or 
liable to comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of its day-to-day 
working.”16
These pronouncements assume that general policy can be distinguished from 
management or administration. As we shall see this is not always the case since 
even though we can distinguish a parastatal from a government department in 
terms of structures, we cannot do so in terms of operations.
Little is known about Ministerial control of parastatals through the issue of 
directives during the colonial period. Nevertheless, this docs not necessarily 
mean that the Ministers at that time were inactive or had no real influence over 
the general policies of parastatals. A possible explanation for this is that 
Ministers at that time exercised their influence informally through discussions, 
negotiations, persuasion and pressure, rather than through the issue of formal 
directions. Evidence of this comes from the former Minister of Transport, Dr. 
Ushewokunze’s statement in Parliament when he was replying to criticisms of 
his practice of promoting blacks through directives. He said:
15 Ibid, p.146.
Ghai, Y., op cit pp.161-162.16
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“When I was Minister of Health, an RF man who was the first 
Chairman of the P.S.C. in independent Zimbabwe came to bid me 
farewell. He said that I was doing what was right for my Govern­
ment and Party by selecting cadres whom I believed could 
translate into practice the policy of a ZANU (PF) — led Govern­
ment. He went on to say that they did exactly that during the days 
his own Party, the R.F., was in power.”17
Thus, in the colonial era Ministers did possess control of parastatals but the 
exercise of such control was carefully hidden, doubtless by a desire to avoid 
having to answer in Parliament for the greater variety of matters about which they 
intervened or were consulted on by statutory corporations, but for which they did 
not wish to be responsible either to Parliament or to the public.18 This subtle 
control through influence raised constitutional problems in that the Ministers 
were able to exercise a great deal of power without accounting for it publicly and 
thereby depriving Parliament of the opportunity to hold the Ministers account­
able.
Through parastatals the colonial regimes saw a new way of pushing forward 
and implementing racist policies without open criticism or debate either in 
Parliament or in public. For example, one of the main Government objectives at 
the time when parastatals like the Rhodesia Railways which was purchased in 
1947 from Rhodesia Railways Ltd.; Air Rhodesia, (formerly Central African 
Airways); Electricity Supply Commission (nowZES A), Grain Marketing Board 
and many others were created was to use them as instruments of the colonial 
government’s employment policies. As Dr. Ushewokunze observed:
“Their establishment was followed by a period of mass employ­
ment, European immigration and the white poverty (a problem 
that had to be tackled) following the end of the Second World 
War. All successive Rhodesian Governments used these parasta­
tals to absorb unemployed whites and European immigrants who 
could not be absorbed by the private sector, the professions and 
the public service. It was a well known fact that the policy at the 
time was to reserve these jobs (higher grades) for the whites (job 
reservation policy)”19
17 Parliamentary Debates (House of Assembly) Vol. 14,No. 38,1 Oth November, 1987-Col. 
2127.
18 On the British experience of Ministerial control over statutory corporations during 
Conservative Governments, as compared to the period when a Socialist Labour Govern­
ment was in power, sec Robson, W. A. Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership op cit 
p.142.
19 Whiles who were in senior positions had hardly any degrees or diplomas. The colonial 
national policy was to improve the standard of living of whites at the expense of blacks and 
the Ministers made sure that this policy was carried out by using their influence in the 
management of the parastatals. Such Ministers did not meet with any resistance in the 
exercise of their control and influence because most (if not all) Board members of 
parastatals were whites and fully identified with to the Government’s racial policies.
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This led to a situation whereby whites occupied higher grades and blacks 
were confined to lower jobs in these and other parastatals. Asaresultsomc whites 
occupied positions of higher grades without proper qualifications for such posts.
A study of the history of the National Railways of Zimbabwe shows that 
management and technical and supervisory grades consisted only of whiles 
while low clerical and manual grades consisted only of blacks. Blacks were paid 
far less than their white counterparts, even when they were doing a similar job 
or a job of a higher grade than a white person. Most blacks who served under 
whites, but were recruited before 1980, possessed not only undergraduate 
degrees but also post-graduate qualifications,
Formal directions were occasionally issued but only if there was a special 
reason to do so, for example, if white supremacy as a policy was seen to be 
challenged. An example of this is when, in 1968:
“. . .  a non white driver in Gwcru was rostered to drive on a shunt 
with a while fireman. The fireman refused to work under an •
African. He immediately drove off to Harare to sec the Minister 
of Transport, the late Mr. Dunlop who immediately issued a 
directive that no while man shall work under a non while .20
It would seem that this directive was issued irrespective of the fact that the 
black driver was accepted by the personnel manager, as better skilled and 
therefore more qual ified than the while fireman to drive on a shunt. The Minister 
here, acted unilaterally without consulting Board members before issuing the 
directive. This, means that he was no longer guiding and directing the relevant 
parastatal on matters of general policy but that he had taken over the day-to-day 
managementand administration of the parastatal by making decisions on matters 
which were properly the Board’s functions. Ministers exercised great influence 
over matters of policy, administration and management through informal 
methods such as negotiations and even pressure on the Board.
Other forms of control Ministers had were in the field of appointment of 
Board members. The appropriate Minister had statutory duties of appointing 
Board members. This placed him/her in a position of great infl ucncc and ensured 
compliance with his/her views and directions. The appointments were for a fixed 
period of three years. This meant that a member who hoped to have his/her 
contract renewed by the Minister at the end of the three years or who did not wish 
to be dismissed was not in a good position to oppose or resist pressure from the 
Minister whether such pressure was applied formally through the issue of 
directives or informally through methods such as consultations, discussions and 
persuasion.
Further, there were other Ministerial controls which were related to financial 
controls which appeared to erode the independence of parastatal organizations.
20 Parliamentary Debates (House of Assembly) Vol.14 No. 38 (supra) Col. 2169.
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For example, where a parastatal was (and still is) to enter into major expansion 
programmes involving huge capital expenditure members of the Board were 
required to seek the approval of the Minister. Without his approval they could 
not proceed with the programme despite commercial advantages arising from 
such programmes. Furthermore, the use of surplus revenues and the power to 
borrow were both subject to ministerial control. Again in matters affecting 
national interest, for example, in times of economic depression, the Minister 
could direct a parastatal to cut down its capital programme. The Ministerial 
controls have not been changed. They have been maintained.
MINISTERIAL CONTROL OF PARASTATALS 
AFTER INDEPENDENCE
As has already been said the power of control given *to the appropriate 
Minister in the old generation of parastatals were very general in nature except 
those given to the appropriate Minister in respect of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation which were very specific in character. This position has not 
changed. Parastatals created before independence retained their form after 
independence. The new generation of parastatals created after independence are 
not different from those created in the colonial period in the way Ministerial 
powers of control are formulated. Examples of the new generation of parastatals 
arc the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) created by Act 
No.31 of 1982, the Zimbabwe Development Bank (ZDB) created by Act No.7 
of 1983, the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDC) created by Act 
No.16 of 1983, the Zimbabwe Reinsurance Corporation (ZRC) created by Act 
No.43 of 1983.
Section 23 of Small Enterprises Development Corporation Act for example, 
provides that:
“The Minister, after consultation with the Board, may give to the 
Corporation such directions of a general character relating to the 
exercise by it of its functions as appear to the Minister to be 
required in the national interests.”
Similar provisions can be found in section 40 of the Zimbabwe Reinsurance 
Corporation Act and section 25 of the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corpo­
ration Act. Thus there has been no attempt to change the general nature of powers 
of control given to the appropriate Minister. What is certain however is that the 
degree of Ministerial control of parastatals has somewhat changed since inde­
pendence. This is understandable given the fact that the present government 
came into power professing a commitment to transforming the country’s 
capitalist economy into a socialist one. As a result, it is presumed that the 
independent government’s creation of parastatals has been predicated upon the 
wider objectives of the creation of parastatals, staled earlier, for example, 
creation of jobs, elimination of unemployment, improvement of standards of 
living of all citizens, and the just distribution of national wealth. In the post­
independence period Ministers regularly resorted to the use of formal directives
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mainly because the informal methods of quiet negotiations did not appear to 
work or the Ministers were impatient with the slow methods of persuasion. The 
failure of informal methods of persuasion could have been a result of the 
unwillingness of the “old guard” managers who had carried on from Rhodesia, 
to fully identify with the policies laid down by the new government. Because of 
difficulties related to Ministerial control of parastatals the government set up the 
Smith Committee of Inquiry into Parastatals in 1986.
The Committee, for example, after inquiring into the Air Zimbabwe Corpo­
ration was of the opinion that , the then Minister of Transport was issuing 
directives on matters which were outside his jurisdiction.21 A review of some of 
the directives issued by the Minister is useful in determining the validity of the 
Committee’s conclusions. Some of these directives as published in the Smith 
Committee Report are reproduced below:22
“You are directed that all transfers, promotions, upgradings,. 
recruitment and the filling of any substantive positions shall not 
be effective until I am fully briefed through a memorandum as I 
have to approve such occurrences. This will apply retrospectively 
to the 3rd January 1984.”
“You are directed to make the following promotions:
(a) First Officer P. Miller to Viscount Captain
(b) First Officer Kuuya to Viscount Captain
These directives arc with immediate effect (To GM 23/2/84)”
“Considering the staff situation in the Operations Division, you 
are directed to appoint Mr. Masimba Chikomo (whose curriculum 
vitae is attached) to the position of Flight Operations Manager (to 
GM 31/10/1985)”
“You are directed to ensure that the proposed new uniforms for 
both Crew and Cabin Staff remain as I originally designed them 
(to Chairman 3/2/86)”
Other directives made by the Minister included the choice of overseas offices 
in London and the order to reinstate an air hostess who had been suspended 
pending dismissal following an act of misconduct. The issue here is whether the 
Minister by issuing such directives was acting ultra vires, that is, beyond his 
powers given to him by statute.23 Whether or not the Minister was acting ultra 
vires depends on the interpretation of the Act and the construction of powers 
conferred upon him by it.
21 Air Zimbabwe Corporation — Interim Report (supra) p.8.
22 Ibid, pp.86-89.
2^  For a discussion of this issue see William & Son (Pvt) Ltd. v Rhodesian Railways 1976(2) 
RLR 108 which is authority for the proposition that directive issued by the Minister to do 
anything illegal will not be tolerated by our courts.
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The determination of whether or not a Minister acted ultra vires his powers, 
involves firstly a determination of whether or not the powers exercised by the 
Minister when he issued a directive were expressly conferred upon him by 
statute. Powers will be expressly conferred upon the Minister if the statutcclearly 
stipulates the circumstances in which he can issue a directive. An example of this 
is section 29 of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Act (Chap. 248) which expressly 
empowers the Minister inter alia to require the Corporation to broadcast a 
statement which the Minister may supply in writing. Secondly where no express 
power has been given to the Minister the question involves determining whether 
or not the powers he or she exercised were reasonably incidental to those 
generally given to him by statute. In other words such powers can be implied. In 
my opinion such powers as those stipulated in section 23 of the Zimbabwe 
Railways Act (Chap. 261) and section 19 of the Air Zimbabwe Act, that is, to give 
directions to the Corporations where it is expedient “in the public interest” to do 
so, fall under the category of implied powers. The question then becomes one of 
ascertaining whether the directives issued by the Minister were reasonable in the 
circumstances.
It is submitted that where directives issued by the Minister are found to be 
unreasonable then they would be ultra vires. Directives are unreasonable, as 
explained in ZAPUfP.F.) v Minister o f Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs,2* if, for instance: (1) they are found to be partial and unequal in their 
operations as between different classes or (2) they are manifestly unjust or (3) 
they disclose bad faith and finally, (4) they involve such oppressive or gratuitous 
interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification 
in the minds of reasonable men. In all these eases the court may conclude that 
Parliament never intended to give authority for such directives, in which case the 
directives would be ultra vires. This basically means that when determining 
whether the Minister was acting reasonably and within the powers given to him 
by statute when he issued a directive the court will look at all the circumstances 
of the ease, including the nature, purpose and effect of the directives.
There has been no post-independence ease where a Board of a parastatal has 
brought an action against a Minister alleging that his directive was ultra vires his 
powers. The only time this happened was before independence in Williams 
Maine & Son Ltd. v Rhodesia Railways25 where the Minister had issued a 
directive which had the effect of breaching an already signed contract. The Board 
brought an action against theMinister claiming that the direction was illegal and 
therefore ultra vires. The court ruled that the direction was illegal in the sense that 
the Minister had issued a direction without correctly understanding the law that 
regulated his powers to give that direction. In other words, the court concluded 
that Parliament could not have intended to give him, in the exercise of his 
discretion, powers to make directions or orders that would amount to an illegal 
act such as the breach of a contract.
21
25
SC.60/85, p.27.
1976 (2) R.I..R. 108.
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Normally, the Board is required by statute to comply with the provisions of 
a direction issued by the Minister. The Board may not comply with such an order 
where it thinks the direction is unreasonable. If at any time the Minister is 
satisfied that the Board has failed to comply with the provis ions of his direction 
it is provided in most statutes creating parastatals that he may, in writing, require 
the Board to comply with his.direction within a specified time. The statutes 
further provide that if the Board fails to comply with such further order, the 
Minister may apply to the High Court for an order compelling the Board to 
remedy the default and the High Court may make such an order as it thinks fit. 
The court, before making an order, will no doubt determine whether or not the 
order is reasonable after hearing evidence from both sides. The courts generally 
exercise extreme restraint in determining how, in their opinion, the Minister’s 
discretion to issue a direction ought to be exercised.
It is surprising that this procedure has not been resorted to particularly in the 
National Railways Corporation case where the Minister issued a directive to the 
Board to promote certain individuals which the Board refused to comply with. 
Instead he went on to promote them himself. This led to accusations that the 
Minister was interfering with the internal management of the Corporation.
Those Ministers, after independence, who had good working relationships 
with their Boards, and there were many, found it unnecessary to issue formal 
directions. Instead, as did their predecessors, their influence over matters of 
policy and management was exercised informally through discussions and 
negotiations. More recently the influence of the Minister has been felt through 
his Permanent Secretary who is an ex officio member of the Board. The presence 
of the Permanent Secretary in Board meetings has an intimidating effect upon the 
minds of the other Board members who may feel powerless to oppose anything 
the Permanent Secretary may say has the approval of the Minister.
The recent events witnessed at the National Railways and Air Zimbabwe 
between the then Minister of Transport and the General Managers of both 
parastatals demonstrate that a General Manager or any Board member usually 
appointed for a fixed period of three years not wanting to risk demotion, would 
not be in a position to resist pressure from the Minister whether the pressure is 
applied formally or informally. For example, the Committee of Public Accounts 
(P.A.C.)2*5 reporting on the activities of the National Railways heard evidence 
from the then General Manager, that a Mr. Chongo, an A rea Traffic Manager, had 
“received rapid promotions through three grades” because he did what the 
Minister had instructed him, that is, to intercept mail between the General 
Manager and the Auditor-General’s Office.
I
Further, no Board member would like to sour his good relationship with the 
Minister for fear that that might frustrate him or her in his or her job or even force 
him or her to resign as did some Board members recently in the Air Zimbabwe 
Corporation. These members resigned because a decision had been taken (which 
they did not approve of) by the Acting Chairman of the Board with the apparent 
approval of the Minister to demote five sectional managers for failing to follow
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proper complaint procedures. Another example is that of the National Railways 
where Mr. Avery, the then General Manager was accused by the Minister of 
practicing racism and of failing to take any steps to comply with the govern­
ment’s policy of black advancement within the Railways. The Minister then 
made some appointments without consulting Mr. Avery. As a result Mr. Avery 
was quoted as having said he was “finding it extremely difficult to operate the 
Railways.”26 7 This has the effect of making the General Managers or Chairman 
feel really “unable to act” as public spokesmen for their parastatal, or even act 
in accordance with their conscience in case they offend the Minister. This denies 
parastatals their commercial independence since they are under constant politi­
cal pressure.
If the independence of a parastatal is allowed to be eroded because Ministe­
rial directives have formally or informally become the order of the day, rather 
than the exception, then Boards become agents of government departments. 
Where the Boards become agents of government departments, they lose mana­
gerial control as Mr. Avery, the General Manager found out. He stated:
“I am not able to do something I want to do. My hands are tied 
and we are going through rough waters right now. I am certainly 
not in control of the situation because of this under current people 
reporting, not to me but to outsiders and then telling me what I 
am supposed to do. Who knows how to run the National Rail­
ways of Zimbabwe better than me the General Manager?”28 .
Further, where governmental influence is exercised informally without the 
publication of directions from Ministers:
“The result is not merely that the lines of responsibility are 
blurred and policy is shifting and uncertain. There is also the 
constitutional aspect, Ministers are able to exercise a great deal of 
power without accounting for it publicly, thus depriving Parlia­
ment of its opportunity to criticize.”29
There is nothing wrong with a Minister who keeps himself familiar with the 
general work of the Board(s) with which he is concerned. Informal discussions 
of mutual interest are useful.30 But, the Minister should not let himself be 
“persuaded to acquiesce in policies which he will find hard to defend in public”.31 
On the other hand the Board should not be induced or persuaded to take decisions 
which they consider to be wrong and opposed to the best interest of the industry
26 First Report of the P.A.C. 25th March, 1986 (Govt. Printers) p.12.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Wade, II.W.R. Administrative Law 4th cd., op cil p.148.
30 Such discussions should be free, frank, forthcoming and co-operative.
Robson, W.A. Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership (Allen & Union, 1962) 2nd 
ed. p.146.
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Imerely in order to please the Minister.32 The Minister should not allow himself, 
by his excessive interference through informal or formal direction or even 
overbearing attitude to undermine the Board’s sense of responsibility which has 
been happening recently, more particularly in the National Railways Corpora­
tion and the Air Zimbabwe Corporation. Itissurelyreasonabletoassumcthatthe 
legislature never intended, for example, that the General Manager “be in a 
position similar to that of a permanent head of a Department vis-a-vis the 
Minister to be in charge of that Department.”
THE PARASTATALS COMMISSION
It is important to note that, on paper at least, some of the Ministerial controls 
over parastatals have now been curbed by the creation of the Parastalals 
Commission in terms of the Parastatals Commission Act No. 22 of 1987. For 
example, for the first time in the history of this country the Ministers no longer 
have important powers of appointing Board Members although they arc still 
required to be consulted on such appointments. The responsibility now falls on 
the Parastatals Commission. No doubt the Minister will still exert his/her 
influence whether formally or informally on who should be appointed and the 
Commission is likely to listen to him/her as it will not afford to ignore his/her 
advice and thereby sour relationships with him/her as an elected representative 
of Government. The question that still remains is one of the degree of that 
influence. Another example is that Ministerial directions are now subject to 
examination or scrutiny for their reasonableness by a non-representative body, 
the Commission. This means that a very small and non-representative body can 
now determine the reasonableness of the Minister’s actions without itself being 
accountable to Parliament or able to answer questions in Parliament for its 
actions. Further, this examination of Ministerial directions by the Commission, 
while it is likely on one hand to deter Ministers from issuing improper directions, 
on the other hand, it will encourage them to exert their influence informally and 
thereby hide their actions from public scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Ministerial control of parastatals through the use of directives varied in 
degree in the two periods, that is, before independence and after independence. 
In general the issue of formal directions depends on a number of things, such as 
the relationship that exists between the Minister and the Board members, the 
Minister’s own interpretation of his powers given him by statute, the Minister’s 
individual enthusiasm in seeing that Government policies are achieved or 
implemented, the size, nature and the national importance of the parastatal 
concerned and finally the formulation of the powers in the provisions giving 
Ministers’ powers to monitor the performance of parastatals. The problem has 
been that the majority of the statutes have formulated ministerial control in very 
vague terms such as die Minister’s power to issue a direction if it is “in the public
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interest” to do so. Each statute leaves it to the Minister to determine what is in 
the public interest. No doubt such a nebulous term invites uncertainty as to the 
limits of Ministerial powers of control.
The more sensible approach to the whole problem is to create a permanent 
Committee made up of five members or more all chosen from the House of 
Assembly. This Committee will act as a kitchen cabinet charged with the 
responsibility of determining what is in the national or public interest and issue 
directions accordingly. This will mean removing all the powers that Ministers 
individually have of supervising and controlling the operation of parastatals. 
This Committee by virtue of its functions will be a political and planning 
Committee answerable directly to Parliament for all its actions. Like in the 
Soviet Union this Committee should not recognize any limits preventing it from 
interfering with a Board’s management of a parastatal, when intervention is 
considered necessary in the interest of national policy. This change would give 
Parliament an opportunity to question or criticise the Committee on its supervi­
sion of parastatals. The functions of the Committee must be clearly defined so 
that there will be no need to interfere with the operational activities of each 
parastatal. Further it will have the advantage of making consistent directions not 
like at the moment when directions in the public interest are issued depending on 
the political enthusiasm of each Minister.
However, if this arrangement is unsatisfactory then we should consider the 
introduction of a Ministry of Parastatals just as we have created the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs and Co-operatives. Its task will be to deal with parastatals, thus 
it will have the responsibility of supervising and ensuring the efficiency of the 
entire range of parastatals. Its main functions would include the appointment and. 
dismissal of members and chairmen of all Boards, defining the pricing and 
investment policies which will be adopted by each parastatal, receiving invest­
ment programmes and approving capital projects, approving capital structures 
and borrowing, promoting co-ordination and co-operation between parastatals 
to improve their commercial efficiency, conducting a general overview of the 
structure and organization of parastatals, and above all being responsible to 
Parliament for the parastatals.
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